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's investment in foreign-policy is national security insurance. there is nothing foreign about foreign policy anymore. smartcan make the small,. w vestments upfront and avoid more costly conflicts and greater burdens down the road. , we'vepast few months seen developments underscore the state -- stakes for having a strong and -- strong american presence in the world. that was a positive step toward stability in the volatile region of the world where we need partnerships. the committee is more than immersed in suyyruiaia. we have treated millions to humanitarian relief -- we have provided millions to humanitarian relief. i expect we will talk about syria somewhat today. having returned from beijing and north koreathe issue took center stage, we are reminded once again that america is the guardian of global security. we should be proud of that. one not turn our back on keys nor will we hesitate what we need to do to defend our allies. if budget is an analyst patient of our values and priorities -- this budget is an illustration of our values and priorities. i have a record of wanting to do defi
, but it does seem to me that a good part of north korean foreign policy is based on bluster. and so if that is your strategy, you know, maybe -- it's less important that the rockets really work, or maybe they don't work at all. that's less important than if you can make people -- and perhaps your own population -- think that they work. >> could i -- i think steve has made some very, very apt points. this is rocket science, and it's not easy. if there is any good news in this story, and i use that term advisedly, it's the fact that north korea's industrial capacities to test on a regular basis and so forth are probably very constrained. because you don't see -- i'm not trying to say it has to be totally equivalent to the kinds of program that is we ran or the russians ran, but this is not what i would regard as a true testing program, and it's just not frequent enough, it's not intense enough to quantify. that said, the challenge here is maybe less what the north koreans may believe they have. it may be more what we believe they have and how we respond accordingly. and i must say the
with pyongyang. the negotiations have been stalled for more than four years. a chinese foreign ministry spokesperson said wu has been invited by his u.s. counterpart, special representative for north korea policy glen davies. the spokesperson said their discussions will focus on maintaining peace and stability on the korean peninsula and keeping it free of nuclear weapons. chinese diplomatic sources say wu is expected to stay in washington from sunday through wednesday. >>> so what do members of the obama administration hope the chinese will do? we asked the director of the brookings institution center for northeast asian policy studies, richard bush. >> china is sometimes able to use its influence to get north korea to the negotiating table. it is less able to use influence to shape north korea's negotiating position, and that's the problem. north korea's goals here and its negotiating stance are dimetrically opposed to those of the united states, japan, and south korea. so the question that ambassador davies will probably be asking ambassador wu is, what evidence is there that north k
to him of his reign. his father died in 1944. two years before that, his dad told foreign reporters that his son, kim jung il had been in charge of day-to-day policies for the previous decade. that takes us back to the early 1980's. if you want to get into real inside baseball, north koreaian media was talking about the rise of the party center in the 1970's. party center being eventually debuted as kim jung il. he had about a quarter century of grooming before becoming the king. he had a long time to consolidate authority. with with his hands on the dashbored, he-dived the plane. he was the only -- he more or less destroyed the institutions of party and state. so by the late 1990's and early 2000's there was no correspondence between what the party was supposed to look like and what the cabinet and state system was supposed to look like and the way he was operating the government. he was more or less running the country out of his bathtub with a couple of police secret forces to help. he paid no attention whatsoever to continuing the dynasty. he was completely feckless on this. t
incentive to buy many of the things is rising sharply, including foreign bonds. and i think certainly the strength of some of the so-called core markets in europe, like france, for example, the past few weeks, probably greatly are due to the shift in japan's policies and maybe it's also starting to shift a bit into the periphery. against the background of the ecb from what i can see preparing the grounds for possible further move of monetary expansion themselves. >> right. yeah. >> so the peripheral narrowing makes a lot of sense. german yields are at such low levels, i wouldn't want to be rushing to put some of the o'neill trust in there. i think the spread timing going on with it makes a bit of sense. >> it's just interesting, as you say, tu look at what japan is doing and the attention shifting now to not just what they hope to achieve, but whether they'll actually be able to accomplish it. after averaging 0.6% deflation for the last couple of decades, are they going to hit 2%? is there, you know, a reason why people here, after the rallies that we've seen, should be a little bit m
Search Results 0 to 4 of about 5

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